Port privatization in an international oligopoly

Matsushima, Noriaki; Takauchi, Kazuhiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2013, 864

Number of Access:274（2025-07-24 04:30 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24922

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Title
Port privatization in an international oligopoly
Creator
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
researchmap permalink
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Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
CreatorName
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000000609696 1000000609696
CreatorName
Takauchi, Kazuhiro
Subject
Port
Privatization
Port charge
Oligopoly
Strategic trade policy
Abstract
We investigate how port privatization affects port charges, firm profits, and welfare. Our model consists of an international duopoly with two ports and two markets. When the unit transport cost is large, privatization of ports decreases the prices for port usage, although neither government has an incentive to privatize its port. The equilibrium governmental decisions are inconsistent with the desirable outcome if the unit transport cost is not large enough. The smaller country’s government is more likely to privatize its port, although the larger country’s government is more likely to nationalize its port to protect its domestic market.
Publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)
864
Date of Issued
2013-02
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/24922
Relation.references
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0864.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers