How Does Downstream Firms’ Eﬃciency Aﬀect Exclusive Supply Agreements?

Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato

How Does Downstream Firms’ Eﬃciency Aﬀect Exclusive Supply Agreements?

Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2015, 878, 1-39

Number of Access:388（2025-07-24 04:28 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/25850

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Title	How Does Downstream Firms’ Eﬃciency Aﬀect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
Creator	NRID 1000030582415 1000030582415 CreatorName Kitamura, Hiroshi
	NRID 1000080334879 1000080334879 ORCID 0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875 researchmap permalink read0116301 read0116301 Scopus Author ID 7005645778 7005645778 CreatorName Matsushima, Noriaki
	NRID 1000070794585 1000070794585 CreatorName Sato, Misato
Subject	Antitrust policy
	Entry deterrence
	Exclusive supply contracts
	Transformational technology
Description	August 2013. Revised September 2015
Abstract	This study constructs a model to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent an upstream supplier from selling input to a new downstream firm. With regard to the technology to transform input produced by the supplier, as an entrant becomes increasingly efficient, its input demand can decrease, and thus, the supplier earns smaller profits when a socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, an inefficient incumbent can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive supply contracts, even in the framework of the Chicago School argument, which comprises a single seller, buyer, and entrant.
Publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)	878
Page	1-39
Date of Issued	2015-09
Language	English
Handle URL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/25850
Relation.references	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0878R.pdf
Access Rights	metadata only access
Category	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Category	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Date.Updated	2015-09

Resource Type	technical report
Local Type	DP/WP
DCMI Type	Text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2015, 878, p. 1-39
DC.title	How Does Downstream Firms’ Eﬃciency Aﬀect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
DC.creator	Kitamura, Hiroshi
	Matsushima, Noriaki
	Sato, Misato
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	English
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	Text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2015-09
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0878R.pdf
DC.subject	Antitrust policy
	Entry deterrence
	Exclusive supply contracts
	Transformational technology
DC.description	August 2013. Revised September 2015
DCTERMS.abstract	This study constructs a model to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent an upstream supplier from selling input to a new downstream firm. With regard to the technology to transform input produced by the supplier, as an entrant becomes increasingly efficient, its input demand can decrease, and thus, the supplier earns smaller profits when a socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, an inefficient incumbent can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive supply contracts, even in the framework of the Chicago School argument, which comprises a single seller, buyer, and entrant.
DC.format	25850
citation_title	How Does Downstream Firms’ Eﬃciency Aﬀect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
citation_author	Kitamura, Hiroshi
	Matsushima, Noriaki
	Sato, Misato
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	English
citation_date	2015-09
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	878
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	39
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/25850
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2013/DP0878R.pdf

How Does Downstream Firms’ Eﬃciency Aﬀect Exclusive Supply Agreements?

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