Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers

Aoyagi, Masaki

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010, 2(1), 150-182

Number of Access:443（2025-11-04 06:26 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/2907

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Title
Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers
Creator
NRID
1000050314430 1000050314430
ORCID
0000-0003-0647-3733 0000-0003-0647-3733
researchmap permalink
Masaki_Aoyagi Masaki_Aoyagi
Scopus Author ID
7201467696 7201467696
CreatorName
Aoyagi, Masaki
Description
Abstract: This paper studies a monopoly pricing problem when the seller can choose the timing of a trade with each buyer, and a buyer's valuation of the seller's good is the weighted sum of his and other buyers' private signals. We show that it is optimal for the seller to employ a sequential scheme that trades with one buyer at a time and allows each buyer to observe the outcomes of all preceding transactions. We also identify conditions under which the seller optimally trades with the buyers in the increasing order of the weights they place on other buyers' signals. (JEL D42, D82, L12)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Source Title
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume (Issue)
2(1)
Page
150-182
Date of Issued
2010-02
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/2907
PISSN
19457669
Relation.isVersionOf
DOI (Publisher Version)
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.1.150
Access Rights
open access
CopyRight
Copyright: American Economic Association
oaire:version
Accepted Manuscript
Category
学術雑誌論文 Journal Article