Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy : Experimental evidence

Aoyagi, Masaki; Fréchette, Guillaume

Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144(3), 1135-1165

Number of Access:450（2025-11-04 06:26 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/3140

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Title
Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy : Experimental evidence
Creator
NRID
1000050314430 1000050314430
ORCID
0000-0003-0647-3733 0000-0003-0647-3733
researchmap permalink
Masaki_Aoyagi Masaki_Aoyagi
Scopus Author ID
7201467696 7201467696
CreatorName
Aoyagi, Masaki
CreatorName
Fréchette, Guillaume
Publisher
Elsevier
Source Title
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume (Issue)
144(3)
Page
1135-1165
Date of Issued
2009-05
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/3140
PISSN
00220531
Relation.isVersionOf
DOI (Publisher Version)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.005
Access Rights
open access
oaire:version
Accepted Manuscript
Category
学術雑誌論文 Journal Article