Exclusive Contracts with Complementary Inputs

Sato, Misato; Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki

Exclusive Contracts with Complementary Inputs

Sato, Misato; Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2015, 918, 1-26

Number of Access:475（2025-07-24 04:29 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/51049

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Title	Exclusive Contracts with Complementary Inputs
Creator	NRID 1000070794585 1000070794585 CreatorName Sato, Misato
	NRID 1000030582415 1000030582415 CreatorName Kitamura, Hiroshi
	NRID 1000080334879 1000080334879 ORCID 0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875 researchmap permalink read0116301 read0116301 Scopus Author ID 7005645778 7005645778 CreatorName Matsushima, Noriaki
Subject	Antitrust policy
	Complementary inputs
	Exclusive dealing
	Multiple inputs
Abstract	This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive contracts in the presence of complementary inputs. A downstream firm transforms multiple complementary inputs into final products. When complementary input suppliers have market power, upstream competition within a given input market benefits not only the downstream firm (by lowering the input price) but also complementary input suppliers (by raising complementary input prices). The downstream firm is thus unable to earn higher profits even when socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, the inefficient incumbent supplier can deter socially efficient entry by using exclusive contracts even in the absence of economies of scale and downstream competition. These results have important implications for antitrust agencies, showing the importance of considering the existence of complementary inputs when examining cases of potential anticompetitive exclusive dealing.
Publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)	918
Page	1-26
Date of Issued	2015-01
Language	English
Handle URL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/51049
Relation.references	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2015/DP0918.pdf
Access Rights	metadata only access
Category	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Category	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

Resource Type	technical report
Local Type	DP/WP
DCMI Type	Text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2015, 918, p. 1-26
DC.title	Exclusive Contracts with Complementary Inputs
DC.creator	Sato, Misato
	Kitamura, Hiroshi
	Matsushima, Noriaki
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	English
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	Text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2015-01
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2015/DP0918.pdf
DC.subject	Antitrust policy
	Complementary inputs
	Exclusive dealing
	Multiple inputs
DCTERMS.abstract	This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive contracts in the presence of complementary inputs. A downstream firm transforms multiple complementary inputs into final products. When complementary input suppliers have market power, upstream competition within a given input market benefits not only the downstream firm (by lowering the input price) but also complementary input suppliers (by raising complementary input prices). The downstream firm is thus unable to earn higher profits even when socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, the inefficient incumbent supplier can deter socially efficient entry by using exclusive contracts even in the absence of economies of scale and downstream competition. These results have important implications for antitrust agencies, showing the importance of considering the existence of complementary inputs when examining cases of potential anticompetitive exclusive dealing.
DC.format	51049
citation_title	Exclusive Contracts with Complementary Inputs
citation_author	Sato, Misato
	Kitamura, Hiroshi
	Matsushima, Noriaki
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	English
citation_date	2015-01
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	918
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	26
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/51049
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2015/DP0918.pdf

Exclusive Contracts with Complementary Inputs

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