Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power

Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato; Kitamura, Hiroshi

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2016, 978, 1-10

Number of Access:471（2025-07-24 11:47 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/57764

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Title
Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power
Creator
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
researchmap permalink
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Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
CreatorName
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000070794585 1000070794585
CreatorName
Sato, Misato
NRID
1000030582415 1000030582415
CreatorName
Kitamura, Hiroshi
Subject
Antitrust policy
Entry deterrence
Exclusive contracts
Nash bargaining
Abstract
This study constructs a simplest model to examine anticompetitive exclusive contracts that prevent a downstream buyer from buying input from a new upstream supplier. Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts.
Publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)
978
Page
1-10
Date of Issued
2016-09-08
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/57764
Relation.references
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2016/DP0978.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers