The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters

Matsushima, Noriaki; Yoshida, Shohei

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2017, 981, 1-18

Number of Access:537（2025-07-24 04:40 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/57822

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Title
The countervailing power hypothesis when dominant retailers function as sales promoters
Creator
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
researchmap permalink
read0116301 read0116301
Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
CreatorName
Matsushima, Noriaki
CreatorName
Yoshida, Shohei
Subject
Countervailing power
Buyer power
Dominant retailer
Two-part tariff
Description
October 2016. Revised July 2017.
Abstract
We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers, who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We then examine how the supplier's outside option in uences the relation between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If the market demand shrinks due to a breakdown of bargaining between the supplier and the dominant retailer, who works as a sales promoter for the product, there is a negative relation between the bargaining power and the retail price.
Publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)
981
Page
1-18
Date of Issued
2017-07
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/57822
Relation.references
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2016/DP0981R.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Date.Updated
2017-07