Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality

Aoyagi, Masaki; Nishimura, Naoko; Okano, Yoshitaka

Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality

Aoyagi, Masaki; Nishimura, Naoko; Okano, Yoshitaka

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2017, 992, 1-49

Number of Access:497（2025-11-04 06:26 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/60627

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Title	Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality
Creator	NRID 1000050314430 1000050314430 ORCID 0000-0003-0647-3733 0000-0003-0647-3733 researchmap permalink Masaki_Aoyagi Masaki_Aoyagi Scopus Author ID 7201467696 7201467696 CreatorName Aoyagi, Masaki
	NRID 1000030218200 1000030218200 CreatorName Nishimura, Naoko
	NRID 1000020513120 1000020513120 CreatorName Okano, Yoshitaka
Subject	heterogeneity
	equity
	efficiency
	transfer
	reciprocity
	laboratory experiments
Abstract	This paper presents an experimental analysis of 2×2 coordination games in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient equilibrium where they earn the same payoffs. The main focus is on the comparison of two treatments with and without the ex post redistribution stage in which both players may voluntarily transfer their payoffs earned in the game to the other player. We find that (1) the transfer opportunity raises the probability of coordination on an efficient equilibrium, (2) a transfer from player 1 to player 2 is positive, and is higher when player 2 chooses the action corresponding to the efficient equilibrium, and hence (3) the transfer opportunity tends to improve the efficiency and equity of the final outcome. Furthermore, these tendencies are stronger when the two players have conflicting interests over the two equilibria than when they have common interests.
Publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)	992
Page	1-49
Date of Issued	2017-03-13
Language	English
Handle URL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/60627
Relation.references	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2017/DP0992.pdf
Access Rights	metadata only access
Category	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Category	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

Resource Type	technical report
Local Type	DP/WP
DCMI Type	Text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2017, 992, p. 1-49
DC.title	Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality
DC.creator	Aoyagi, Masaki
	Nishimura, Naoko
	Okano, Yoshitaka
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	English
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	Text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2017-03-13
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2017/DP0992.pdf
DC.subject	heterogeneity
	equity
	efficiency
	transfer
	reciprocity
	laboratory experiments
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper presents an experimental analysis of 2×2 coordination games in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient equilibrium where they earn the same payoffs. The main focus is on the comparison of two treatments with and without the ex post redistribution stage in which both players may voluntarily transfer their payoffs earned in the game to the other player. We find that (1) the transfer opportunity raises the probability of coordination on an efficient equilibrium, (2) a transfer from player 1 to player 2 is positive, and is higher when player 2 chooses the action corresponding to the efficient equilibrium, and hence (3) the transfer opportunity tends to improve the efficiency and equity of the final outcome. Furthermore, these tendencies are stronger when the two players have conflicting interests over the two equilibria than when they have common interests.
DC.format	60627
citation_title	Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality
citation_author	Aoyagi, Masaki
	Nishimura, Naoko
	Okano, Yoshitaka
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	English
citation_date	2017-03-13
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	992
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	49
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/60627
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2017/DP0992.pdf

Efficiency and Voluntary Redistribution under Inequality

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