Local Independence, Monotonicity, Incentive Compatibility and Axiomatic Characterization of Price-Money Message Mechanism

Urai, Ken; Murakami, Hiromi

Local Independence, Monotonicity, Incentive Compatibility and Axiomatic Characterization of Price-Money Message Mechanism

Urai, Ken; Murakami, Hiromi

Discussion Papers In Economics And Business, 2017, 17-08, 1-15

Number of Access:411（2025-08-27 04:45 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/60702

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Title	Local Independence, Monotonicity, Incentive Compatibility and Axiomatic Characterization of Price-Money Message Mechanism
Creator	NRID 1000000203597 1000000203597 researchmap permalink read0175173 read0175173 Scopus Author ID 24287014300 24287014300 CreatorName Urai, Ken
Creator	NRID 1000080803072 1000080803072 CreatorName Murakami, Hiromi
Subject	Resource Allocation Mechanism
	Social Choice Correspondence
	Overlapping-Generations Economy
	Monotonicity
	Incentive Compatibility
	Universal Mapping Property
	Monetary Walras Allocation
	Local Independence
Abstract	To characterize money in a static economic model, it is known to be important to consider the agent-commodity double-infinity settings, i.e., the overlapping-generations framework. There does not seem to exist abundant literature, however, treating the axiomatic characterization problems for such monetary Walras allocations under the social choice and/or mechanism design settings. We show that the monetary Walras allocation for the economy with double infinities is characterized by weak Pareto-optimality, individual rationality and local independence or the monotonicity, or the incentive compatibility conditions of social choice correspondence among the allocation mechanisms with messages under the category theoretic approach in Sonnenschein (1974). We utilize Sonnenschein's market extension axiom for swamped economies that is closely related to the replica stability axiom of Thomson (1988). We can see how these conditions characterize the price-money message mechanism universally among a wide class of mechanisms, and efficiently in the sense that it has the minimal message spaces (price-money dictionary theorems). Moreover, by using the category theoretic framework, we can obtain the up-to-isomorphism uniqueness for such a dictionary object (isomorphism theorems).
Publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
Source Title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
Volume (Issue)	17-08
Page	1-15
Date of Issued	2017-04
Language	English
Handle URL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/60702
NCID	AA1160366X
Relation.references	URI http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1708.pdf
Access Rights	metadata only access
Category	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Category	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business

Resource Type	technical report
Local Type	DP/WP
DCMI Type	Text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business. 2017, 17-08, p. 1-15
DC.title	Local Independence, Monotonicity, Incentive Compatibility and Axiomatic Characterization of Price-Money Message Mechanism
DC.creator	Urai, Ken
DC.creator	Murakami, Hiromi
DC.publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	English
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	Text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2017-04
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1708.pdf
DC.subject	Resource Allocation Mechanism
	Social Choice Correspondence
	Overlapping-Generations Economy
	Monotonicity
	Incentive Compatibility
	Universal Mapping Property
	Monetary Walras Allocation
	Local Independence
DCTERMS.abstract	To characterize money in a static economic model, it is known to be important to consider the agent-commodity double-infinity settings, i.e., the overlapping-generations framework. There does not seem to exist abundant literature, however, treating the axiomatic characterization problems for such monetary Walras allocations under the social choice and/or mechanism design settings. We show that the monetary Walras allocation for the economy with double infinities is characterized by weak Pareto-optimality, individual rationality and local independence or the monotonicity, or the incentive compatibility conditions of social choice correspondence among the allocation mechanisms with messages under the category theoretic approach in Sonnenschein (1974). We utilize Sonnenschein's market extension axiom for swamped economies that is closely related to the replica stability axiom of Thomson (1988). We can see how these conditions characterize the price-money message mechanism universally among a wide class of mechanisms, and efficiently in the sense that it has the minimal message spaces (price-money dictionary theorems). Moreover, by using the category theoretic framework, we can obtain the up-to-isomorphism uniqueness for such a dictionary object (isomorphism theorems).
DC.format	60702
citation_title	Local Independence, Monotonicity, Incentive Compatibility and Axiomatic Characterization of Price-Money Message Mechanism
citation_author	Urai, Ken
citation_author	Murakami, Hiromi
citation_publisher	Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University
citation_language	English
citation_date	2017-04
citation_journal_title	Discussion Papers In Economics And Business
citation_volume	17-08
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	15
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/60702
citation_abstract_html_url	http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1708.pdf

Local Independence, Monotonicity, Incentive Compatibility and Axiomatic Characterization of Price-Money Message Mechanism

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