Naked Exclusion under Exclusive-offer Competition

Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2018, 1021, 1-40

Number of Access:419（2025-07-24 04:19 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/67812

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Title
Naked Exclusion under Exclusive-offer Competition
Creator
NRID
1000030582415 1000030582415
CreatorName
Kitamura, Hiroshi
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
researchmap permalink
read0116301 read0116301
Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
CreatorName
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000070794585 1000070794585
CreatorName
Sato, Misato
Subject
Antitrust policy
Exclusive dealing
Exclusive-offer competition
Imperfect competition
Abstract
This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. Under exclusive-offer competition, the upstream firm’s profit depends on the rival’s exclusive offer. If the rival makes an exclusive offer acceptable for the downstream firm, the upstream firm is excluded unless it succeeds in exclusion. Consequently, the upper bound of exclusive offers becomes higher than when one of the upstream firms is a potential entrant that cannot make any exclusive offer.Thus, the exclusion of the existing upstream firm can be an equilibrium outcome even in the case where the potential entrant is never excluded.
Publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)
1021
Page
1-40
Date of Issued
2018-03
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/67812
Relation.references
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2018/DP1021.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers