Strategic intertemporal budget allocation of local governments in the model with spillovers and mergers

Akai, Nobuo; Goto, Tsuyoshi

OSIPP Discussion Paper, 2018, DP-2018-E-011, 1-26

Number of Access:455（2025-09-04 17:05 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/70594

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Title
Strategic intertemporal budget allocation of local governments in the model with spillovers and mergers
Creator
NRID
1000050275301 1000050275301
researchmap permalink
akainobuo akainobuo
Scopus Author ID
6603545791 6603545791
CreatorName
Akai, Nobuo
NRID
1000030880223 1000030880223
CreatorName
Goto, Tsuyoshi
Subject
Strategic intertemporal budget allocation
Merger
Spillover
Abstract
Mergers of local governments, commonly referred to as municipalmergers, have been implemented widely to internalize spillover effects. Many empirical studies point out that municipalities strategically increase their debt issuance before mergers, creating the `fiscal common pool problem', because of pooled budgets after mergers. However, this phenomenon has not yet been analyzed theoretically. Therefore, this paper examines the mechanism of increased debt issuance before municipal mergers. Our results show that three different effects influence intertemporal budget allocations of municipalities at the time of a merger and the existence of externalities may reduce the severity of the fiscal common pool problem.
Publisher
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Source Title
OSIPP Discussion Paper
Volume (Issue)
DP-2018-E-011
Page
1-26
Date of Issued
2018-09-28
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/70594
Relation.references
URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2018/DP2018E011.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
OSIPP Discussion Paper