An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Mukherjee, Arijit

An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Mukherjee, Arijit

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2018, 1043, 1-34

Number of Access:460（2025-11-04 06:11 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/70606

Item Information

Output File Export EndNote Basic Export Mendeley

Title	An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition
Creator	NRID 1000020768238 1000020768238 CreatorName Chen, Chia-Hui
	NRID 1000040324222 1000040324222 ORCID 0000-0002-0674-0216 0000-0002-0674-0216 researchmap permalink read0116302 read0116302 Scopus Author ID 36927932200 36927932200 CreatorName Ishida, Junichiro
	CreatorName Mukherjee, Arijit
Subject	market entry
	market competition
	private learning
	signaling
	entry timing
Abstract	This paper provides a dynamic game of market entry to illustrate entry dynamics in an uncertain market environment. Our model features both private learning about the market condition and market competition, which give rise to the first-mover and secondmover advantages in a unified framework. We characterize symmetric Markov perfect equilibria and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the first-mover advantage to dominate, which elucidates when and under what conditions a firm becomes a pioneer, an early follower or a late entrant. We also derive equilibrium payoff bounds to show that pioneering entry is generally payoff-enhancing, even though it is driven by preemption motives, and discuss efficiency properties of entry dynamics.
Publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)	1043
Page	1-34
Date of Issued	2018-10-26
Language	English
Handle URL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/70606
Relation.references	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2018/DP1043.pdf
Access Rights	metadata only access
Category	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Category	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

Resource Type	technical report
Local Type	DP/WP
DCMI Type	Text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2018, 1043, p. 1-34
DC.title	An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition
DC.creator	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Mukherjee, Arijit
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	English
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	Text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2018-10-26
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2018/DP1043.pdf
DC.subject	market entry
	market competition
	private learning
	signaling
	entry timing
DCTERMS.abstract	This paper provides a dynamic game of market entry to illustrate entry dynamics in an uncertain market environment. Our model features both private learning about the market condition and market competition, which give rise to the first-mover and secondmover advantages in a unified framework. We characterize symmetric Markov perfect equilibria and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the first-mover advantage to dominate, which elucidates when and under what conditions a firm becomes a pioneer, an early follower or a late entrant. We also derive equilibrium payoff bounds to show that pioneering entry is generally payoff-enhancing, even though it is driven by preemption motives, and discuss efficiency properties of entry dynamics.
DC.format	70606
citation_title	An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition
citation_author	Chen, Chia-Hui
	Ishida, Junichiro
	Mukherjee, Arijit
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	English
citation_date	2018-10-26
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1043
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	34
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/70606
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2018/DP1043.pdf

An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition

Item Information

Show details