Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy : Evidence from Japan

Kojima, Kenta; Takii, Katsuya

OSIPP Discussion Paper, 2019, DP-2019-E-008, 1-46

Number of Access:422（2025-09-01 11:19 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73192

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Title
Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy : Evidence from Japan
Creator
NRID
1000000634247 1000000634247
CreatorName
Kojima, Kenta
NRID
1000070346138 1000070346138
researchmap permalink
k-takii k-takii
Scopus Author ID
6603896348 6603896348
CreatorName
Takii, Katsuya
Subject
Internal labor market
Career paths
Promotion
Fast track
Bureaucracy
Abstract
This paper develops a novel method that assigns a job a value to capture both the likelihood and speed of promotion from each job to a top executive and applies it to investigate the career paths of bureaucrats in Japan. We find that outwardly similar jobs within the same hierarchical rank, estimated using the standard method in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), have very different opportunities to be promoted to a top executive. We can also detect frequent real demotions and the presence of early selection (read fast track) of elite bureaucrats unable to be detected through use of hierarchical rank.
Publisher
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Source Title
OSIPP Discussion Paper
Volume (Issue)
DP-2019-E-008
Page
1-46
Date of Issued
2019-08-26
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/73192
Relation.references
URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2019/DP2019E008.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
OSIPP Discussion Paper