Elections accelerate inefficiencies in local public good provision with decentralized leadership

Akai, Nobuo; Watanabe, Takahiro

OSIPP Discussion Paper, 2021, DP-2021-E-004, 1-23

Number of Access:451（2025-07-07 12:02 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/79422

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Title
Elections accelerate inefficiencies in local public good provision with decentralized leadership
Creator
NRID
1000050275301 1000050275301
researchmap permalink
akainobuo akainobuo
Scopus Author ID
6603545791 6603545791
CreatorName
Akai, Nobuo
CreatorName
Watanabe, Takahiro
Subject
Election
Decentralized leadership
Interregional transfer
Abstract
This paper introduces the election process to the traditional decentralized leadership model, where the central government does not have a pre-commitment ability, and interregional transfer is optimally designed ex post. In the traditional decentralized leadership model, it has been shown that local public good provision is distorted by ex post transfer. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the introduction of the election process affects inefficiencies in the decentralized leadership situation. Our results show that the direction of this distortion depends on the commitment environment, and the degree of this distortion depends on the degree of spillover.
Publisher
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Source Title
OSIPP Discussion Paper
Volume (Issue)
DP-2021-E-004
Page
1-23
Date of Issued
2021-02-25
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/79422
Relation.references
URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2021/DP2021E004.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
OSIPP Discussion Paper