Lobbying and tax competition in an oligopolistic industry: a reverse home-market effect

Kato, Hayato

Spatial Economic Analysis, 2018, 13(3), 276-295

Number of Access:316（2025-09-04 08:30 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/81777

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Title
Lobbying and tax competition in an oligopolistic industry: a reverse home-market effect
Creator
NRID
1000030837703 1000030837703
ORCID
0000-0002-2063-8453 0000-0002-2063-8453
researchmap permalink
30837703 30837703
Scopus Author ID
57200115385 57200115385
CreatorName
Kato, Hayato
Subject
tax competition
economic geography
reverse home-market effect
lobbying
Description
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Spatial Economic Analysis on 2018, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/17421772.2018.1425477.
Abstract
This paper studies tax competition between two asymmetrical countries for an oligopolistic industry with many firms. Each government sets its tax rate strategically to maximize the weighted sum of residents’ welfare and political contributions by owners of firms. It is shown that if the governments care deeply about contributions and trade costs are low, the small country attracts a more than proportionate share of firms by setting a lower tax rate. The well-known home-market effect, which states that countries with a larger market attract a more-than-proportionate share of firms, may be reversed as a result of tax competition by politically interested governments.
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Source Title
Spatial Economic Analysis
Volume (Issue)
13(3)
Page
276-295
Date of Issued
2018-02-09
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/81777
PISSN
17421772
eISSN
17421780
NCID
AA1219220X
Relation.isVersionOf
DOI (Publisher Version)
https://doi.org/10.1080/17421772.2018.1425477
Access Rights
open access
oaire:version
Accepted Manuscript
Category
学術雑誌論文 Journal Article