Is Environmental Tax Harmonization Desirable in Global Value Chains?

Cheng, Haitao; Kato, Hayato; Obashi, Ayako

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 2020, 21(1), 379-416

Number of Access:165（2025-05-13 16:13 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/81780

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Title
Is Environmental Tax Harmonization Desirable in Global Value Chains?
Creator
CreatorName
Cheng, Haitao
NRID
1000030837703 1000030837703
ORCID
0000-0002-2063-8453 0000-0002-2063-8453
researchmap permalink
30837703 30837703
Scopus Author ID
57200115385 57200115385
CreatorName
Kato, Hayato
NRID
1000030528922 1000030528922
CreatorName
Obashi, Ayako
Subject
environmental policy
fragmentation
emission tax competition
international coordination
trade in parts and components
Description
Cheng, Haitao, Kato, Hayato and Obashi, Ayako. "Is Environmental Tax Harmonization Desirable in Global Value Chains?" The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, vol. 21, no. 1, 2021, pp. 379-416. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2019-0346.
Abstract
The spatial unbundling of parts production and assembly currently characterizes globalization, leading to the worldwide dispersion of pollution. We consider socially optimal (cooperative) environmental taxes in a two-country model of global value chains in which the location of both parts and assembly can differ. When unbundling costs are so high that parts and assembly must colocate in the pre-globalized world, pollution is spatially concentrated, and harmonizing environmental taxes maximizes global welfare. In contrast, with low unbundling costs triggering the dispersion of parts and thus pollution throughout the world as today, harmonization fails to maximize global welfare. Similar results hold when the two countries non-cooperatively choose their environmental taxes.
Publisher
De Gruyter
Source Title
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy
Volume (Issue)
21(1)
Page
379-416
Date of Issued
2020-08-08
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/81780
eISSN
19351682
Relation.isIdenticalTo
DOI (Publisher Version)
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2019-0346
Access Rights
open access
CopyRight
© 2020 Haitao Cheng, et al., published by De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
oaire:version
Version of Record
Category
学術雑誌論文 Journal Article