An experiment on the Nash program : Comparing two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric et al.

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2022, 1175, 1-29

Number of Access:338（2025-11-03 10:25 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/88473

Item Information

Output File Export EndNote Basic Export Mendeley

Title
An experiment on the Nash program : Comparing two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
Creator
CreatorName
Chessa, Michela
NRID
1000070400611 1000070400611
ORCID
0000-0003-3127-690X 0000-0003-3127-690X
researchmap permalink
nhanaki nhanaki
Scopus Author ID
16233221700 16233221700
CreatorName
Hanaki, Nobuyuki
CreatorName
Lardon, Aymeric
NRID
1000090401570 1000090401570
CreatorName
Yamada, Takashi
Subject
Nash program
Bargaining procedures
Shapley value
Experiments
Abstract
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shap?ley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter’s demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer?based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, hereas the demand-based Winter mechanism bet?ter implements allocations that reflect players’ effective power.
Publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)
1175
Page
1-29
Date of Issued
2022-05
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/88473
PISSN
0473453X
eISSN
24350982
Relation.references
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2022/DP1175.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers