The Countervailing Power Hypothesis and Contingent Contracts

Matsushima, Noriaki; Yoshida, Shohei

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2022, 1191, 1-14

Number of Access:354（2025-07-24 04:31 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/89376

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Title
The Countervailing Power Hypothesis and Contingent Contracts
Creator
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
researchmap permalink
read0116301 read0116301
Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
CreatorName
Matsushima, Noriaki
CreatorName
Yoshida, Shohei
Subject
Countervailing power
Buyer power
Dominant retailer
Two-part tariff
Contingent contract
Abstract
We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We examine how contract type influences the relationship between the dominant retailer’s bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If the contracts between the supplier and fringe retailers are contingent on the bargaining outcome between the supplier and the dominant retailer, the bargaining power does not affect the retail price. In contrast, if contracts with fringe retailers are not contingent, the relationship between bargaining power and retail price can be either positive or negative.
Publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)
1191
Page
1-14
Date of Issued
2022-10
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/89376
PISSN
0473453X
eISSN
24350982
Relation.references
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2022/DP1191.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers