The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking

Daido, Kohei; Murooka, Takeshi

OSIPP Discussion Paper, 2022, DP-2022-E-005, 1-29

Number of Access:416（2025-10-10 15:00 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/89687

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Title
The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking
Creator
NRID
1000070388354 1000070388354
CreatorName
Daido, Kohei
NRID
1000010796345 1000010796345
researchmap permalink
takeshimurooka takeshimurooka
Scopus Author ID
37079438400 37079438400
CreatorName
Murooka, Takeshi
Subject
Multitasking
Signaling
Leadership
Pay for Performance
Help
Overwork
Abstract
We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible task and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has private information on the value of the non-contractible task, and there are followers who can also contribute to this task. We highlight a new mechanism by incorporating leading-by-example (Hermalin, 1998) in a multi-tasking model. To prevent excessive effort by the agent with low value on the non-contractible task, the principal provides high-powered incentives for the contractible task. We discuss its organizational implications to pay for performance, incentives to help colleagues, and prevention of overwork.
Publisher
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Source Title
OSIPP Discussion Paper
Volume (Issue)
DP-2022-E-005
Page
1-29
Date of Issued
2022-11-25
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/89687
Relation.references
URI
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2022/DP2022E005.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
OSIPP Discussion Paper