Strategic environment effect and communication

Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Ozkes, I. Ali

Experimental Economics, 2022, 26, 588-621

Number of Access:386（2025-11-03 10:25 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/90188

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Title
Strategic environment effect and communication
Creator
NRID
1000070400611 1000070400611
ORCID
0000-0003-3127-690X 0000-0003-3127-690X
researchmap permalink
nhanaki nhanaki
Scopus Author ID
16233221700 16233221700
CreatorName
Hanaki, Nobuyuki
CreatorName
Ozkes, I. Ali
Subject
Communication
Cooperation
Reinforcement learning
Strategic environment
Structural topic modeling
Text mining
Description
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09774-7.
Abstract
We study the interaction of the effects of the strategic environment and communication on the observed levels of cooperation in two-person finitely repeated games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium and replicate previous findings that point to higher levels of tacit cooperation under strategic complementarity than under strategic substitutability. We find that this is not because of differences in the levels of reciprocity as previously suggested. Instead, we demonstrate that slow learning coupled with noisy choices may drive this effect. When subjects are allowed to communicate in free-form online chats before making choices, cooperation levels increase significantly to the extent that the difference between strategic complements and substitutes disappears. A machine-assisted natural language processing approach then shows how the content of communication is dependent on the strategic environment and cooperative behavior, and indicates that subjects in complementarity games reach full cooperation by agreeing on gradual moves toward it.
Publisher
Springer
Source Title
Experimental Economics
Volume (Issue)
26
Page
588-621
Date of Issued
2022-12-20
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/90188
PISSN
13864157
eISSN
15736938
NCID
AA11257387
Relation.isVersionOf
DOI (Publisher Version)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09774-7
Access Rights
open access
oaire:version
Accepted Manuscript
Category
学術雑誌論文 Journal Article