An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric et al.

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, 141, 88-104

Number of Access:398（2025-11-03 10:25 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92343

Link to primary information 

File Format Terms of use Size Views Date.Available Description information
GamesEconBehav_141_88 pdf None 568 KB 12 2025.06.20  
Creative Commons : Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives

Item Information

Output File Export EndNote Basic Export Mendeley

Title
An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
Creator
CreatorName
Chessa, Michela
NRID
1000070400611 1000070400611
ORCID
0000-0003-3127-690X 0000-0003-3127-690X
researchmap permalink
nhanaki nhanaki
Scopus Author ID
16233221700 16233221700
CreatorName
Hanaki, Nobuyuki
CreatorName
Lardon, Aymeric
NRID
1000090401570 1000090401570
CreatorName
Yamada, Takashi
Subject
Bargaining procedures
Experiments
Nash program
Shapley value
Description
Chessa M., Hanaki N., Lardon A., et al. An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value. Games and Economic Behavior 141, 88 (2023); https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010.
Abstract
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed.
Publisher
Elsevier
Source Title
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume (Issue)
141
Page
88-104
Date of Issued
2023-06-20
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92343
PISSN
08998256
eISSN
10902473
NCID
AA11537077
Relation.isVersionOf
DOI (Publisher Version)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010
Access Rights
open access
CopyRight
© 2023. This manuscript version is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
oaire:version
Accepted Manuscript
Category
学術雑誌論文 Journal Article