Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?

Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2022, 32(1), 158-176

Number of Access:313（2025-07-24 04:20 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92428

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Title
Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?
Creator
NRID
1000030582415 1000030582415
CreatorName
Kitamura, Hiroshi
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
researchmap permalink
read0116301 read0116301
Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
CreatorName
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000070794585 1000070794585
CreatorName
Sato, Misato
Subject
Durable goods
Exclusive supply chain
Vertical relation
Antitrust policy
Description
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Kitamura H., Matsushima N., Sato M.. Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 32, 158 (2023), which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12497. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.
Abstract
We explore the supply chain problem of a downstream durable goods monopolist, who chooses one of the following trading modes: an exclusive supply chain with an incumbent supplier or an open supply chain, allowing the monopolist to trade with a new efficient entrant in the future. The expected retail price reduction in the future dampens the profitability of the original firms. An efficient entrant's entry magnifies such a price reduction, causing a further reduction of original firms' joint profits. In equilibrium, the downstream monopolist chooses the exclusive supply chain to escape further price reductions, although it expects efficient entry.
Publisher
John Wiley and Sons Inc
Source Title
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
Volume (Issue)
32(1)
Page
158-176
Date of Issued
2022-09-15
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92428
PISSN
10586407
eISSN
15309134
NCID
AA10819787
Relation.isVersionOf
DOI (Publisher Version)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12497
Access Rights
open access
CopyRight
© 2022 Wiley Periodicals LLC.
oaire:version
Accepted Manuscript
Category
学術雑誌論文 Journal Article