The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms

Arai, Yasuhiro; Matsushima, Noriaki

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2023, 56(1), 114-132

Number of Access:231（2025-07-24 11:42 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92429

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Title
The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms
Creator
NRID
1000020611213 1000020611213
CreatorName
Arai, Yasuhiro
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
researchmap permalink
read0116301 read0116301
Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
CreatorName
Matsushima, Noriaki
Subject
Mutual outsourcing
Supplier
Delegation
Asymmetric managerial forms
Description
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Arai Y., Matsushima N.. The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms. Canadian Journal of Economics 56, 114 (2023), which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12638. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.
Abstract
We consider a downstream duopoly model with a monopolistic common supplier and mutual outsourcing between the two symmetric downstream firms. The market structure captures the recent procurement environment in the smartphone industry. We also incorporate managerial delegation into the duopoly model because deciding on organizational forms within a firm is critical to achieving better performance in almost all industries. There is an equilibrium in which only one of the firms delegates its downstream production to its sales manager. A delegating firm becomes less aggressive. The profits when both firms delegate can be higher than those when no firm delegates. Social welfare when both firms delegate can be smaller than that when no firm delegates.
Publisher
John Wiley and Sons Inc
Source Title
Canadian Journal of Economics
Volume (Issue)
56(1)
Page
114-132
Date of Issued
2023-01-24
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92429
PISSN
00084085
eISSN
15405982
NCID
AA11618419
Relation.isVersionOf
DOI (Publisher Version)
https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12638
Access Rights
open access
CopyRight
© 2023 Canadian Economics Association.
oaire:version
Accepted Manuscript
Category
学術雑誌論文 Journal Article