Personalized pricing with heterogeneous mismatch costs

Matsushima, Noriaki; Mizuno, Tomomichi; Pan, Cong

Southern Economic Journal, 2023, 90(2), 369-388

Number of Access:235（2025-07-24 04:35 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92838

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Title
Personalized pricing with heterogeneous mismatch costs
Creator
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
researchmap permalink
read0116301 read0116301
Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
CreatorName
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000060589315 1000060589315
CreatorName
Mizuno, Tomomichi
NRID
1000030807425 1000030807425
CreatorName
Pan, Cong
Subject
group pricing
heterogeneous consumer types
Hotelling model
personalized pricing
Description
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Matsushima N., Mizuno T., Pan C.. Personalized pricing with heterogeneous mismatch costs. Southern Economic Journal 90, 369 (2023), which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12654. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.
Abstract
Personalized pricing has become a reality through digitization. We examine firms' incentives to adopt one of the three pricing schemes: uniform, personalized, or group pricing in a Hotelling duopoly model. There are two types of consumer groups that are heterogeneous in their mismatch costs. We show that both firms employ personalized pricing in equilibrium regardless of the heterogeneity of consumer groups. If the consumer groups' heterogeneity is significant, the profits are higher when both firms use personalized pricing than when they employ uniform pricing; otherwise, the latter profits are higher than the former. Profits are highest when firms employ group pricing among the three cases. The ranking of consumer welfare among the three cases is opposite to that of profits.
Publisher
John Wiley and Sons Inc
Source Title
Southern Economic Journal
Volume (Issue)
90(2)
Page
369-388
Date of Issued
2023-10-01
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/92838
PISSN
00384038
eISSN
23258012
Relation.isVersionOf
DOI (Publisher Version)
https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12654
Access Rights
embargoed access
CopyRight
© 2023 The Southern Economic Association.
The full-text file will be made open to the public on 1 October 2025 in accordance with the publisher's policy.
oaire:version
Accepted Manuscript
Category
学術雑誌論文 Journal Article