Strategic anonymity and behavior-based pricing

Colombo, Stefano; Garella, G. Paolo; Matsushima, Noriaki

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2023, 1219, 1-28

Number of Access:197（2025-07-24 04:15 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/93488

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Title
Strategic anonymity and behavior-based pricing
Creator
CreatorName
Colombo, Stefano
CreatorName
Garella, G. Paolo
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
ORCID
0000-0002-7865-3875 0000-0002-7865-3875
researchmap permalink
read0116301 read0116301
Scopus Author ID
7005645778 7005645778
CreatorName
Matsushima, Noriaki
Subject
strategic anonymity
behavior-based pricing
privacy
Abstract
In a model of behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD), we argue that sellers may have discretionary power to let buyers decide whether to be identified (e.g., creating an account) or remain anonymous (no account creation). The price equilibria generate a more fragmented market segmentation than under the standard BBPD. Firms might prefer a policy where they leave buyers the decision to remain or not be anonymous, breaking the standard BBPD result. Furthermore, firms can realize higher profits than under uniform pricing, contrary to the standard BBPD. Also, firms may adopt asymmetric policies concerning the account creation requirement.
Publisher
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Source Title
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
Volume (Issue)
1219
Page
1-28
Date of Issued
2023-11
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/93488
PISSN
0473453X
eISSN
24350982
Relation.references
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2023/DP1219.pdf
Access Rights
metadata only access
Category
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers