Egalitarian equivalence and implementability imply equal division

Hayashi, Takashi

大阪大学経済学, 2023, 73(2・3), 8-15

Number of Access:609（2025-06-07 01:54 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.18910/93330

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Title
Egalitarian equivalence and implementability imply equal division
Creator
CreatorName
Hayashi, Takashi
Subject
Egalitarian equivalence
Nash implementability
strategy-proofness
non-bossiness
Description
Article
Abstract
This paper shows that any Nash-implementable social choice correspondence satisfying egalitarian equivalence must select equal division when the number of individuals is greater than the number of goods. It also shows that any strategy-proof and non-bossy social choice function satisfying egalitarian equivalence must select equal division, under the same assumption.
Publisher
大阪大学経済学会・大阪大学大学院経済学研究科
The Economic Society of Osaka University and Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Source Title
大阪大学経済学
Osaka Economic Papers
Volume (Issue)
73(2・3)
Page
8-15
Date of Issued
2023-12
Language
English
Handle URL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/93330
DOI
https://doi.org/10.18910/93330
eISSN
24240397
NCID
AN00030111
Access Rights
open access
oaire:version
Version of Record
Category
本学関連学会 Related Societies
Osaka Economic Papers / Vol.73 No.2・3